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Jump to. Sections of this page. Accessibility Help. Email or Phone Password Forgot account? Sign Up. Log In. Forgot account? Not Now. Related Pages. UA Magazine Website. Pages Liked by This Page. Recent Post by Page. Worse than that - no one seems to answer them or is going to answer them. The first question is: " Why did Russia start the war in Ukraine anyway? At first Moscow was really concerned about the possible signing of the association agreement which was theoretically completed by Ukraine's membership , but this disgrace turned to indifference over time.
Doesn't this prove that the act of signing an EU-Ukraine association agreement was not the stone of the accident? While it must be said that everything that strengthens Ukraine's integration with the West is itself dangerous for Moscow.
Wasn't it Maidan that caused Russia's invasion of Ukraine? Let us remember that many times, with a certain obsession, has repeated the thesis about the threat carried by the " colorful revolutions ".
Revolutions of the " colorful revolutions " appeared in many speeches of Vladimir Putin, as well as in important programming documents of Russian foreign and security policies.
To sum it up, I believe that Moscow started a war against Ukraine over Maidan and its aim was to prevent Ukraine's integration into European structures. Theoretically, the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych and the onset of clearly pro-Western forces should bring Ukraine closer to the European Union, rather than further away from the European Union.
Unfortunately, only Moscow can see those beyond their eastern borders. From the war in Ukraine, they suggest that if Ukraine is so important to Moscow that the Kremlin is willing to go to war over it, it is not appropriate to show excessive activity in the Ukrainian field and thus irritate Moscow even more.
Will memory win or feeling? After this statement, we must inevitably ask ourselves a second equally important question. Did Russia manage to conquer Ukraine with war or did it achieve exactly the opposite goal?
By preventing Ukraine from becoming a member of the EU which is unfortunately unrealistic soon , she won. At the same time, the Kremlin lost because its aggression in Ukraine caused resistance and hostility to Russia in Ukrainian society.
All that matters now is what lasts longer. Historical memory of Ukrainians or the belief of Germans and French that it is not good to tease Russia? To understand Moscow's motivation, we must not forget that Russia is run by Secret Service officers. But not those from the KGB aeropag, such as Yevgeny Primakov, that is, people with strategic thinking.
Today's Russia is run by middle-category officers. There are many officers whose intellectual level is limited to tactical thinking in all intelligence services besides brilliant analysts and strategists and strategists. If we analyze Russian foreign policy for the last twenty years, its strategic weakness and high tactical skills are visible. However, both tactical and strategic levels require a realistic assessment of available assets and chances. From the interviews I had in Moscow diplomat with Russian diplomats and political technology with close ties to the Kremlin , I am most recall their professionalism, clear logic of reasoning, and above all sober realism.
Their realism on Ukraine was manifested in a poorly hidden or even honest belief that sooner or later, Russia would lose Ukraine sooner or another. A stable attractive partner for the West If Moscow was really aware that it could weaken or even sabotage Ukrainian statehood, but also has to accept it, she is also aware that Ukrainians will not forgive it for the annexation of Crimea nor the war on Donbas. So, during the decision on the war, Russia was more driven by what the West would take from it.
It was betting that there would be only one thing for the West - Ukraine cannot be accepted into Western structures. I believe that the hostility of Ukrainians towards Russia caused by war has no effect on Moscow's decision-making.
I would even dare say that, as in Poland, a certain rusophobia of Ukrainians is advantageous for Moscow. It can be successfully traded in the West by pointing out the incurable Polish or recently Ukrainian nationalism. Yet Russia is still an attractive partner for the West in view of its geographical, military, technological, technological and raw material potential and not least, considering its ambitions , even though these ambitions often push Moscow to risky play on the international stage and often exceed its real options.
This is not important, however, because the mere fact that Moscow started the game is enough to make it successful. Russia is a global player involved in all key outbreaks of the modern world tension, starting with Central and Eastern Europe, through the Middle East, Central Asia, Afghanistan, to Korea and Southeast Asia.
From his neighbours point of view, perhaps the worst fact is that many people in the West see Russia as a potential ally in confrontation with China. But Russia will never become such an ally of the West, just because it has to accept the status of a younger partner. But the West does not understand yet and continues to live in illusion. When someone in the West no longer believes in an alliance with Russia, they live in fear of Moscow's equally illusory partnership with Beijing.
This partnership exists in a sense, but it is more the result of the division of spheres of influence than a true alliance. Ukraine is not at the center of the West's interest and unfortunately there is nothing to suggest that it will be there anytime soon.
Let us just remember when American "reboot" policy began - in , just a year after the Russian-Georgian war. Isn't this proof that Russian neoimperialism and revanshism in the post-Soviet space do not prevent the West from having dialogue with Russia?
If Russia promises not to use chemical weapons in the UK and interfere with elections in the West, superpowers will be happy to deal with Russia. However, if we return to the abovementioned resetting of relations between the West and Russia, it is more than clear that the West's reduced engagement on Ukraine was not random. On the contrary, it was part of the reboot. Even today, talks about the need for a reset will not be quiet.
It could be said that in Moldova, we were recently able to watch the dirt test that led to a change in government under pressure from Russia, the US and the European Commission.
I bet Moldova won't end it. In time, Ukraine could become the subject of a similar operation unless already happened. Balancing zone is not a buffer zone In Polish media, I have published several articles highlighting the threat of "new Yalta". I mean a superpower agreement at the expense of small states - in this case at the expense of Ukraine.
However, the term I used was not accurate enough. Yalta every Polish understands that his country was in the sphere of Soviet influence. For Ukraine, such a "new Yalta" would mean that this country will find itself in a buffer zone. Today, Ukraine is unlikely to find itself exclusively in the sphere of Russian influence.
But what seems unrealistic or not real today can become a reality in the next decade. Ukraine must maintain the Western vector of its policies and try to integrate with the West at least partially, although it does not have a real chance of becoming a member of the EU today. But as long as the game continues, while Kiev presents a challenge for Moscow, it still has a chance to remain in the already mentioned buffer zone, which of course, may not be eternal.
It's not an optimal solution, but it is a certain shift. This is a step forward compared to an alternative, which unfortunately is not EU accession, but the embrace of Moscow.
Of course, you can imagine a scenario in which the West and Russia will find a match. However, such a scenario is purely theoretical, because Russia will never give up its ambitions on the Ukrainian issue. Even if a certain agreement is reached, it will most likely be a framework agreement that will suggest certain "red lines" but will not regulate the region's long-term balance. And the game itself will continue. From Ukraine's point of view, the most important thing is that it is stronger, richer, more democratic and less corrupt every time they give out cards.
More cards will be given away many more times, as the game itself can continue for decades. Unintentionally and unnoticed After the Orange Revolution in , one of President Viktor Yushchenko's closest associates told me during the debate about the people of Donbas that they were not ready to choose the West at the moment, and that it would be best if Ukraine became part of the West somehow " accidentally and unnoticed ", so that one day even the most pro-Russian inhabitants of Donbas will realize that it is more connected to the West than Russia.
Unfortunately, one of the unfortunate consequences of war is that many EU Member States consider Ukraine a problem and a barrier to relations with Moscow. To start thinking differently, it would help if Ukraine's integration with the West went kind of randomly and unnoticed so that even the most pro-Russian inhabitants of Madrid, Lisbon, Paris and Berlin would one day realize that its neighbor is Ukrainian, his daughter goes out with her Ukrainian boyfriend, his son just got back from Kiev and he is going to Odessa on business.
In order to happen, it will require a lot of patience, wisdom and wit from us. Playing for a long time and the game itself will be more complicated and difficult than chess. And the Russians, as we know, are good at chess.
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Strategic or Identity-Based Euroscepticism? the Euro Discourse of Vaclav Klaus
Academic journal article Romanian Journal of Political Science. The study of Euroscepticism to this point has taken place largely in research on political parties and public behaviour. There is a substantial body of work which has found that Euroscepticism is employed either as a strategic tool or as an important factor in constructing the actor's identity. Less attention has been paid to individual politicians, probably because not many have held influential executive positions. The study of these individual politicians and the scope and manner of their use of Euroscepticism in their political entrepreneurship is thus increasingly relevant, not only as regards the study of Euroscepticism itself, but also as it impacts upon European integration. Since the overall momentum of Euroscepticism has gained across Europe in recent years, it is also important to determine if this increase is connected to the use of Euroscepticism as a strategic tool or whether it foreshadows changes in the ideological treatment of European integration. This article analyses the discourse of Vaclav Klaus on European integration during his tenure in office as president of the Czech Republic.
Name: Globalization and European Cohesion. The publication was supported by the Visegrad Fund. Introduction Dear Readers Social dimension of foreign policy became an integral part of my work as the Minister of Foreign Affairs after the elections in autumn You can see that in practice when we as the Czech Republic, after several years break, started again to pay contributions to the International Labour Organization and agreed on supporting some of its concrete projects.